This paper investigates how service delivery of employment-related federal programs administered at American Job Centers (AJCs) changes as local unemployment increases. We analyze the impact of such changes on labor market outcomes of program participants using data for the Trade Adjustment Assistance (TAA) participants. We find that the demand for TAA services increases substantially when local unemployment increases. A 5-10% increase in unemployment raises training enrollment through the TAA program by nearly 13 percentage points and increases participation duration by over 9 weeks. Our results do not support the concern that a sudden rise in the demand for AJC services might deteriorate the quality of service delivery and outcomes. In fact, while increases in local unemployment are generally harmful to displaced workers, occupational training during this time is effective at reducing the size of wage loss by at least 46% resulting in a 3.4% average increase for wage replacement rates.
I. Introduction
Over the past few decades, the labor force of the United States has been transformed with the decline in manufacturing sector as one of the most noticeable features. Between 1980 and 2013, production-related employment has decreased at an annual rate of 1.13% while non-farm total employment has increased at 1.78%. This trend has strengthened from 2000 to 2013 with a loss of 2.12% in production-related jobs annually compared to growth of 0.25% total nonfarm employment annually.
i While this decline in manufacturing employment is particularly harsh on low-skilled workers, federal employment-related programs are in place to help these workers by providing various services like job training.
The majority of these programs are administered at the American Job Centers (AJCs) ii .
AJCs are the brick-and-mortar version of the One Stop System that was created by the Workforce Investment Act (WIA) of 1998 iii to be the universal access point for many federal programs such as Unemployment Insurance (UI), Employment Services, Welfare to Work, and the Trade Adjustment Assistance (TAA). AJCs also provide services such as dissemination of local labor market information and workshops on resume writing and interview skills to anyone with no eligibility requirement. Currently, there are nearly 3,000 AJCs across the country.
Previous investigations have found that these programs face difficulties when there is a sudden increase in the number of workers in need of assistance (GAO, 2004) . (Beneria & Santiago, 2001 ) described the situation regarding mass-layoffs at the Smith-Corona Corporation in Cortland, NY, in 1992. (GAO) also stated that one of the difficulties that arise from a sudden increase in the workers in need is that the staff does not have enough time to properly assess each worker's training needs. This can prevent the workers from finding the most appropriate training at the AJC. This case is well illustrated by The New Yorker Magazine (Boo, 2004) . When a Fruit of the Loom plant in Texas laid off all of its 791 workers to move its operation to Honduras in 2003, many of these dislocated workers chose the health care assistant training program based on the local employment projections. However, the surge in the supply of workers with this specific skill set made it harder for these trainees to secure a job after exiting the program. (Theodore & Carlson, 1998) found that the assessment of local employment opportunities is based on aggregate labor market information rather than detailed information related to skill-level or occupations. The lack of decent information on more-tailored job opportunities makes the work of AJCs less efficient and this issue could become worse when AJCs face unusually high workloads caused by an increase in the number of unemployed workers in the local area.
This paper addresses the issue of changes in service delivery at AJCs and their potential impacts by focusing on the TAA program during times of increased local unemployment. The TAA program is an attempt by policymakers to help workers displaced due to import competition. It is established by the Trade Act of 1974 to reduce workers' adjustment costs by helping workers find a new career path that would provide them with comparable earnings and a satisfying job experience. The core benefits are job training and extended income support.
Various services such as worker assessment and career planning are offered to help participants make training decisions and choose the appropriate occupations for training.
We investigate how an increase in workloads at local AJCs influences the quality of the delivery of TAA services. We then analyze the impact of such changes on labor market outcomes -reemployment rates and wage replacement rates. We use the change in the number of unemployed workers at the Metropolitan Statistical Area (MSA) level as a proxy for the changes in the workload of AJCs. TAA benefits are provided at AJCs along with many other programs that serve adult workers, youth, and dislocated workers. For this reason, the AJC workload is various services such as job training, income support, job search assistance, and Health Insurance Tax Credits (HITC) vi . For the complete list of the TAA benefits vii , see (Park, 2012) .
The TAA services are provided at the American Job Centers (AJCs). AJCs are part of the One Stop System established by the Workforce Investment Act (WIA) of 1998 viii to streamline all federal employment and training services. Therefore, the AJC staff does not only serve TAA participants but also any adult or youth workers who seek federal assistance in their immediate and future employment.
The services provided at AJCs are composed of three tiers: core services (local vacancy listings, employment projection information, resume writing and interview skill workshops),
intensive services (worker assessment, counseling, career planning), and training. Core services are provided through public-use computers and various brochures available at AJCs without any particular staff assistance. A worker who wants to receive services beyond this point can receive intensive services upon approval. In order to maximize cost efficiency, all participants are required to receive core services before discussing the possibility of receiving intensive services. (Berk & Dolfin, 2010) found that 41.9% of TAA participants in their sample received counseling on whether training is necessary.
Once training is deemed essential to reemployment of a participant, he/she can choose one of many training options provided under the TAA: occupational skills training, on-the-job training (OJT), customized training, and remedial training. Approximately 90% of trainees receive occupational skills training and this takes place at a local community college or a vocational school. OJT is provided on site once a participant is employed. In this case, the DOL pays 50% of the participant's wage up to six months. Customized training is provided by a local firm and is designed to teach skill sets specific to the needs of the firm. The difference between OJT and customized training is that OJT trainees are employees of the firm and on a payroll during the training and the trainees in customized training are not. In addition to these training opportunities, participants can receive remedial training. Remedial training includes more basic education such as a GED certification or English language instruction. The TAA-certified training can last up to 2 years with 6 additional months for remedial training. (Mack, 2009) found that the decision on whether to receive training is often left to the participants, but AJC staff is more involved in choosing a specific training program.
In order to make training a viable option for the participants, the TAA provides a Trade Readjustment Allowance (TRA); this is extended income support for the entire duration of training. TRA payments kick in when the participant exhausts Unemployment Insurance (UI) it is difficult to handle all the logistics, such as notifying workers and setting up appointments, for a large number of workers within the deadline." It also reports that meeting the 8-16 week deadline was a challenge for three quarters of 46 states surveyed. This challenge becomes even greater when local unemployment increases (Mack, 2009 ).
Additionally, the 2002 Reform Act puts tighter restrictions on the use of the TAA budget allocated to each state. 85% of its total funding is tied to training enrollment and TRA payments for trainees. Only 15% of the funds can be spent on any non-training services. In order to deal with the funding needs for other services, including worker assessment and counseling, the 2002
Reform Act encourages co-enrollment of TAA participants in WIA. Once the participant is coenrolled in WIA, he/she is more likely to receive all eligible services using WIA funds. (Mack, 2009 ) noted that this co-enrollment -and the resulting delivery of the appropriate level of TAA services -is negatively affected when WIA staff receives a new influx of cases due to an increase in local unemployment.
x III. Data
III.1. Trade Act Participant Report (TAPR)
The Trade Act Participant Report (TAPR) is the data set that the DOL collects on the participants of the TAA program. The data collection began in the third calendar quarter of 1999.
We acquired the data set through the Freedom Of Information Act. (Dolfin & Berk, 2010) have in their sample.
Only 25% of the participants in our sample have at least some college education and 65% of the participants are 40 years or older. The literature on the TAA program have consistently found that the TAA participants, compared to other unemployed workers, are older, less educated and have longer tenure with the previous employers; a higher fraction of them have limited English proficiency as well (Baicker & Rehavi, 2004; Corson & Decker, 1995; Dolfin & Berk) . We observe the same stylized facts with our sample compared to unemployed manufacturing workers and all unemployed workers reported in (Dolfin & Berk) .
[ Table 1 about here ]
Panel B presents the summary of service receipts for our sample. A direct comparison of service receipts to the sample from (Dolfin & Berk, 2010) A surprisingly large number of participants were issued a training requirement waiver (83.69%). (GAO, 2004) reported that a training waiver is often issued to earn time before enrolling in training without losing eligibility for training and income support. We find support for this claim in our sample. 69.18% of participants with a training waiver later received some type of training. This falls to 51.50% for the post-reform sample compared to 88% for the prereform sample. This is possibly due to the strict 8-16 training enrollment deadline. With this deadline imposed, the incentive to receive a waiver decreases which is evidenced by a much smaller fraction of participants seeking the waiver. [ Table 2 about here]
We find that trainees have a much higher reemployment rate. Wage replacement rates are slightly higher for non-trainees, but post-participation earnings differ greatly. The earnings differentials are observed in pre-participation earnings as well. The average quarterly earnings for non-trainees is more than 20% higher than those that train. It is possible that participants with better skill sets expect to find a job without training or find a new occupation and opt out of training. Overall, the outcome measures vary across participant characteristics and services they received. We control for these differences in our estimations.
III.2. TAA Petition Data
In order to analyze the workload changes at the local American Job Centers (AJCs), we need location information for the participants. Unfortunately, TAPR does not report the participant address beyond the state of his/her residency in order to protect their privacy. We merge the TAA petition data to TAPR using the TAA petition number reported in TAPR. TAA petition data include information about the petitioned plant such as location (up to street address), industry, petition date, and whether it is certified or denied. By assuming that a worker lives within a commuting distance from the previous employer, the address of the former workplace is used as a proxy for the participant location. The TAA petition data set is also acquired through FOIA. 289,440 participant cases are successfully matched to the petition data and identified with approximate geographic location.
III.3. Local Area Unemployment Statistics (LAUS)
In order to measure the workload variation of local AJCs we use changes in the number of unemployed workers at the MSA-level xiv from LAUS published by the U.S. [ Table 3 about here]
Merging the LAUS data to TAPR data, we show changes in service delivery and labor market outcomes with local unemployment growth in Table 4 . Similar to Table 3 , most (76.88%) participants join the program during periods of unemployment changes that range between -15%
and 15%. As seen in Table 3, [ Perhaps in an extremely favorable labor market, people feel secure enough to take this as a skillupgrading opportunity. In all cases, the majority of training enrollment takes the form of occupational skills training.
The impacts of changes in local unemployment on labor market outcome measures are less straightforward. Reemployment rates are largely unaffected by the changes in local unemployment. Wage replacement rates are affected more. While it does not display a monotonic trend, wage replacement rates are lower during periods of high increases in unemployment. This is also the case in terms of the level of post-participation earnings.
IV. Estimation
The main goal of this paper is to investigate how an increase in the workload at the access point of TAA services influences the delivery of these services and what such a change in service delivery means for their post participation reemployment and wage replacement rates.
While usage of these measures in evaluating federal training program is problematic (Barnow & Smith, 2004) , these are easily measurable by using information reported in the TAPR.
The main variable used as a proxy for the increase in AJC's workload is the percentage change in the number of unemployed workers at the MSA level compared to the previous year.
We use the unemployment change rather than the unemployment rate because it is more directly linked to the workload of AJCs. We believe that the change in local unemployment is better at capturing the workload of AJCs than the change in TAA participants or the unemployment rate.
We do not use the change in the size of TAA participants because the TAA is a relatively small program compared to other programs accessible at AJCs and therefore the change in TAA participants is not likely to have a large influence on the overall operation of AJCs. A reasonable increase in TAA participants can be handled by spreading the cases among the staff members.
This may affect the quality of service delivery if these TAA layoffs are associated with a mass layoff in which case the increase in local unemployment would reflect this large increase.
We do not use the unemployment rate or its changes because the unemployment rate is influenced by the changes in the labor force as well as the changes in the unemployed and the unemployment change captures the changes in people flowing through AJCs. xvii AJCs serve anyone who is seeking assistance in finding a job. Whether a worker's need for assistance is due to a recent displacement or re-entry into the labor force, the worker is not likely to make a substantial difference in AJC operations. Furthermore, in an area with high jobless rates, the AJC is more likely to be prepared to handle the consistently large flow of participants of any programs they handle. In fact, TAA funds are allocated to each state based on the number of participants in the previous fiscal year. The difficulty arises when there is an unusually large flow of participants increasing the typical workload of case workers. However, following the insights of (Beaudry & DiNardo, 1991) , we use the unemployment rate at the time of exit as a control in our estimations to separate the effect of job search in a bad labor market from the effect of service changes due to workload increases. xviii IV.1. Methodology
We use increases in unemployment at the time of participation as a proxy for the workload of local AJCs in investigating how the delivery of TAA services might change along with the labor market outcomes from receiving these services as a result of increased workloads.
Equation (1) describes the baseline estimation for evaluating the delivery of TAA services while Equation (2) provides the baseline estimation for evaluating outcomes. We use probit analysis for the indicators of training enrollments and reemployment. We use ordinary least squares for duration variables and wage replacement rates.
Equation ( 
, is a vector of indicator dummies describing changes of unemployment for the MSA of the individual at the time of displacement. These indicators take the value of one if an MSA meets one of the following changes in unemployment: an increase of 25% or more, an increase of 15-25%, an increase of 10-15%, an increase of 5-10%, an increase of 0-5%, a decrease of 25% or more, a decrease of 15-25%, a decrease of 10-15% or a decrease of 5-10%.
Therefore, a decrease of 0-5% unemployment at a MSA makes the comparison group in our estimation. We use indicator variables rather than percentage changes due to the nonlinear relationship between unemployment changes and service delivery variables as shown in Table   4 . xix Our data displays a prominent U-shape for enrolling in training compared to changes in local unemployment. However, this shape is not symmetric in size. Therefore, we use dummy indicators to provide the most flexibility in analyzing the data regarding the delivery of services.
We Equation (2) provides the basis for the second set of estimations on post-participation labor market outcome measures: reemployment and wage replacement rates. Again, the postparticipation outcomes are observed for three quarters. The reemployment indicator is 1 if a participant is employed for at least one quarter during the first three quarters from the exit.
Another outcome variable we explore is the wage replacement rate. It is the ratio of quarterly earnings of new employment to that of previous employment.
For labor market outcomes we use a different specification identifying changes in unemployment in a quadratic fashion. The variables provide this specification where i indicates whether the change in unemployment is greater than zero (inc) or less than zero (dec) and j provides the quadratic shape. We separate changes in unemployment into increases versus (2) is the same as Z i from Equation (1) but it also includes pre-participation earnings due to the fact that higher earnings are harder to replace as workers go through displacement and career changes as shown in Table 2 . The age variable in this estimation is the age at the time of program exit rather than participation. While age at participation in Equation (1) captures the differences in the voluntary decisions in choosing services and training program, age at exit in Equation (2) is to capture the influence of the worker's age on the job search and the hiring process. Analysis of the impact of service delivery changes on labor market outcomes focuses on two major changes we observe in the analysis of service delivery: enrollment in occupational training and participation duration (in weeks). The impact of receiving these services during the period of higher AJC workloads is captured by the interaction terms between the local unemployment changes and the service variables. [ Table 5 about here ]
V. Results

V.1. Service Delivery
A 0-5% increase in local unemployment at the time of participation raises the likelihood of enrolling in any type of training by 7.59 percentage points compared to a period with a 0-5% decrease in unemployment at the MSA. This increases to 12.96 percentage points for a 5-10% increase in local unemployment. This is driven by an enrollment increase in occupational skills training which climbs 9.27 percentage points for a 0-5% increase in local unemployment or 13.75% for a 5-10% increase in local unemployment. To put this in context, recall that the average training enrollment rates for the MSA sample are 69.52% for any training and 65.00%
for occupational skills training (Table 4) . When a worker is displaced with a small chance of finding a job with an existing skill set, he/she has an incentive to enroll in job training to acquire new marketable skills. As discussed above, whether to take training is largely up to the participants themselves when the AJC staff receives an unusually high workload. With the training opportunities readily available under the TAA program, it is not surprising to see such a large increase in training enrollment.
Training completion rates rise by 7.23 percentage points with a 0-5% increase in local unemployment where the average training completion rate is around 70%. This again jumps to 17.94 percentage points for a 5-10% increase in local unemployment compared to a 0-5% decrease in unemployment. Again, this is not surprising. One reason to leave the training program early is that a trainee finds a job. In a harsher labor market, the chance of finding a job during training is smaller; trainees are more likely to stay until the end of training program.
Similarly to the training enrollment rate, the impact of increases in local unemployment on training completion makes the large jump in the 5-10% increases. Additional increases are not statistically different than the results seen in the 5-10% increases.
More training enrollment and higher completion rates translate to a longer duration of training and participation. A 0-5% increase in local unemployment leads to 7.6 more weeks in the TAA program with 5.95 more weeks in training compared to a 0-5% decrease in local unemployment. Again, this takes another big jump with a 5-10% increase in unemployment leading to 13.4 more weeks of participation in the program and 9.3 more weeks of training.
Matching between the occupation of training and that of reemployment actually increases by 9.3
percentage points with a 0-5% increase in local unemployment while it drops by 13.6 percentage points in cases of extremely large unemployment increases (25% or more).
V.2. Altered Service Delivery and the Outcomes
The previous section shows that an increase in workload at the AJC -proxied by increases in local unemployment -alters the nature of service delivery for the TAA program greatly. The most noticeable trend is that there is a substantial increase in the demand for various services. This is especially true for occupational skills training leading to longer durations of participation. In this section, we investigate how such changes in service delivery influence the labor market outcomes of participants who enter the program in a labor market with increasing local unemployment.
One hypothesis discussed earlier is that the choice of training occupation is less than ideal during periods of high local unemployment increases due to the reduction in resources assigned to each participant. As noted in (Mack, 2009), training choices are generally left to participants in cases of a large increase in the AJC staff workload. These unsupervised choices could deteriorate the program performances. On the other hand, the training opportunities provide a means for dealing with harsh labor markets by providing new marketable skills.
In order to test these hypotheses, we focus on occupation skills training enrollment xxii and participation duration. The labor market outcome measures used here are the reemployment rate and the wage replacement rate. We estimate three specifications. The first is a simple estimation of the impact of various services on reemployment and wage replacement rates without any variables containing local unemployment changes. The second specification includes the change in unemployment separated by increases and decreases along with the quadratic terms as described earlier. The third specification is our main specification to analyze the impact of altered service delivery induced by changes in local unemployment on labor market outcomes.
We use the interaction term between the unemployment change and service variables of interest:
the indicator for occupational skills training enrollment and participation duration measured in weeks. The results are shown in Tables 6 and 7. [ Table 6 about here ]
Enrolling in occupational skills training raises the reemployment rate and lowers the wage replacement rate regardless of the local labor market situation. The lower wage replacement rate for occupational skills training is likely to be picking up the selection problem around training enrollment. The workers who lack other marketable skills due to low educational attainment and narrow job experience are more likely to enroll in occupational skills training.
The previous employment for these workers could have been protected by unions resulting in a high wage rate. This combined with a lower skill level makes it harder for these workers to find a new job with comparable wage compared to workers with more marketable skills.
Both reemployment and wage replacement rates are negatively affected by the rise in local unemployment. A 5% increase in local unemployment at the time of participation reduces the reemployment rate by 0.77 percentage points compared to workers displaced with no change in local unemployment. The impact on wage replacement rates is larger. A 5% increase in unemployment reduces wage replacement rates by 1.38 percentage points. xxiii In this second specification, the coefficients are nearly the same when considering both positive and negative changes in unemployment.
The third specification for both the reemployment rate and the wage replacement rate provides two facts. First, we do not find any evidence of worse outcomes for the trainees who entered training during periods of high unemployment growth. For wage replacement rates, we find a significant positive effect. While high unemployment growth causes a large decline in the wage replacement rate, enrolling in occupational skills training reduces this decline by nearly half.
In cases of an increase in local unemployment, the wage replacement rate of the TAA participants falls but occupational skills training offsets this decline by 46%. xxiv This suggests that unsupervised training choices during periods of high workloads do not deteriorate labor market outcomes. xxv This could be an indication that in-depth worker assessment and counseling is not crucial in improving participants' outcomes. There is some support for this where (Koppel & Hoffman, 1996) pointed out that training vouchers -which essentially leaves decision making to workers -are more efficient. While our analysis does not make any comparison between training and potential alternatives, our results could support the idea of a training voucher by
showing that hands-on case management is not superior in terms of outcomes and inferior in terms of cost efficiency.
Another noticeable change in service delivery during high unemployment growth periods is the increase in the duration of training and participation. One way that participation duration might influence labor market outcomes is that participants can wait out the unfavorable labor market situation by participating in the TAA program for a longer period by enrolling in occupational skills training. The analysis of this hypothesis is presented in Table 7 .
[ Table 7 In order to confirm that our results are not specific to our sample, we estimate the same specifications using variations of our sample -two time subsamples and different geographic [ Table 8 about here ]
The results are qualitatively similar for the post-reform sample, but the magnitude is much larger. Local unemployment increases of 5-10% raises occupational skills training enrollment and the training completion rate by 26.2 and 22.9 percentage points, respectively compared to local unemployment decreases of 0-5%. This is compared to 13.75 and 17.9
percentage points in the main estimation presented in Table 5 . A further increase in local unemployment raises the occupational skills training enrollment even higher. xxvii As discussed earlier, the Reform Act of 2002 tightened the deadline for training enrollment to either 8 weeks from certification or 16 weeks from separation. If a participant fails to find a job by this deadline, he/she is incentivized to enroll in a training program in order to avoid losing the other benefits.
Finding a job soon after separation (or certification) is more difficult with higher local unemployment growth; more participants are put into a situation where he/she needs to make a quick training decision. The large and negative coefficient on matching with 15-25% unemployment growth is the evidence that sub-optimal decisions were made due to a tight deadline and extra difficulty of finding a job. Since the choices of training occupation as well as the decision to enroll in a training program are made hastily, the match between the occupations of training and reemployment is harder to achieve. of the adverse effect. Reemployment rates are not significantly changed when we consider the two time subsamples. Increases in local unemployment are still damaging to reemployment and while enrolling in occupation skills training increases the reemployment rate, enrolling during increases in unemployment is not statistically better.
[ Table 9 about here ]
We repeat the same analysis using information at the county-level rather than MSA-level in Tables 10 and 11 . This expands the size of the estimation sample by 25-32%. Table 10 shows the link between the local unemployment increases and the delivery of the TAA services. The results are similar to our main sample. The impacts on enrollment in any training are more subdued for moderate growth; they do not consistently take the big jump with increases of 5-10%. Training duration and completion rates also increase with similar magnitudes to those discussed in the MSA sample. Table 11 shows the impacts of such changes in service delivery on post-participation outcomes. Again, we have the same qualitative results on both reemployment rates and wage replacement rates with slight changes to the magnitude and the levels of significance.
xxviii [ Table 10 about here ]
[ weeks for a 5-10% increase in unemployment) and participation (additional 13.4 weeks for a 5-10% increase in unemployment).
We find that enrolling in occupational skills training during periods of high unemployment growth is particularly beneficial by offsetting the adverse effect of a bad labor market on wage replacement rates. Previous research (GAO, 2004; GAO, 2007; Mack, 2009) suggests that the TAA program may be less effective at times when local unemployment surges.
We do not find support for this. High local unemployment growth generates a uniformly negative effect on two key post-participation labor market outcomes: the reemployment rate and the wage replacement rate. An increase in local unemployment reduces the wage replacement rate but receiving occupational skills training offsets at least 46% of this negative effect. This finding is robust across various samples. We explore two time subsamples for the MSA sample In this section of the appendix, we provide an alternative to Equation (2) using the dummy variables from Equation (1). Similar to the rationale for using dummies in Equation (1), we want to provide the results for a less strict functional form on wage replacement rates and reemployment rates. We estimate the effects of increasing unemployment and the impact on receiving occupational training on labor market outcomes using the following equation:
Occ i is an indicator function on whether the displaced worker receives occupational training and this is interacted with Δ , , which is the same set of variables from Equation (1).
Otherwise, the variables are the same variables used in Equation (2).
The results are shown in Table A1 . Increases in local unemployment at the time of displacement are harmful to wage replacement rates where this harm is increasing at a decreasing rate. Workers displaced with a 5-10% increase in local unemployment see wage replacement rates drop 6.2 percentage points compared to workers displaced with a 0-5% decrease in local unemployment. This harm rises to a drop of 10.5 percentage points in the wage replacement rate for worker displaced with large increases in local unemployment (25% or more). Obtaining occupational training during these times offsets this damage by 48.2-68.2% resulting in a 3.4% xxix average increase in wage replacement rates. In order to make sure that our results are not biased due to this over-smoothing, we carry out the same estimations performed using the MSA samples excluding the seven large MSAs that are affected by the SSA methodology. Table A2 presents the impact of local unemployment changes on TAA service delivery and Table A3 presents the impacts on the reemployment rate and the wage replacement rate. A comparison between Table A2 with Tables 5 and 8 and a   comparison between Table A3 with Tables 6 and 9 show that our main results are robust. For the post-reform sample, all coefficients are larger with the non-smoothed MSA samples. (a) These statistics are calculated using the entire sample from the Trade Act Participant Report. (b) Trade Act Participant Report (TAPR) reports the quarterly earnings for three quarters immediately prior to participation rather than three quarters prior to the qualifying layoff. For this reason, it is not rare to have zeros or substantially smaller earnings figures in later quarters. In order to pick up the earnings from the previous employment that participants are certified for the TAA benefits, we chose the maximum value among the reported earnings. (c) We discard the earnings information if the maximum quarterly earnings among the reported value is less than $2,000. $2,000 represents the approximate level of quarterly earnings if a worker is employed full time at minimum wage. Earnings below $2,000 could be temporary employment between the qualifying layoff and participation.
. iv See more details on this in the section on estimation.
v As layoffs occur, a petition may be filed with the U.S. DOL by the firm, a group of workers, a union, a state, or a local unemployment agency. The DOL carries out an investigation and certifies the petition if the layoffs are caused by import competition. Once certified, all workers displaced between the certification date or the first day the layoffs began, whichever is earlier, and two years from the certification date are eligible for the TAA benefits. Eligible workers are individually notified by their state. Once a state receives a certification notice from the DOL about a plant, the state receives a list of eligible workers and informs them individually. ix Possible reasons for issuance are expectation of recall by the previous employer, having marketable skills, having health issues, or the unavailability of training programs at the moment.
x You will find in the robustness section that our results are not driven by the 2002 Reform Act. The results are qualitatively the same when we perform our analysis on data after 2002.
xi Due to missing and invalid entries for some variables reported, the sample size varies across estimation specifications.
xii The Dolfin and Berk (2010) sample includes all workers who were eligible for TAA regardless of their actual participation status. We do not have access to the necessary information of the sample of all unemployed. xiii DOL's goal for 2010 was to achieve 64.9% reemployment, 87.3% retention, and a $13,319 6-month earning. The measured results were 58.2%, 79.7%, and $14,487, respectively. Prior to 2007, the wage replacement goal was 80%, and the result was 89% in 2006 and 76% in 2005. xiv We use MSAs as a unit of local labor market in the benchmark sample rather than counties due to the frequency of crossing county borders to work. MSAs generally represent a commutable area. Limiting the analysis to countylevel could be too restrictive. Another reason is that the size of counties varies greatly while MSAs are reasonably uniform. We do present the results using the county sample as a robustness check in section V.3. We have 82,857 observations identified with a MSA, 114,525 identified with a county, and 34,418 identified with both.
xv Researchers have been concerned by the long-run trend smoothing methodology employed in the estimation of LAUS data. The concern is that it overly reduces the monthly volatilities in the estimates. In order to make sure our main results are not biased due to this over-smoothing, we carry out the same analysis using the MSA samples excluding the seven large MSAs estimated using the long-run smoothing methodology. The coefficients are very similar to those estimated using all MSA samples implying that our main finding is robust across long-run smoothing methodologies. More details on the limitations of LAUS data estimation and the results using the nonsmoothed samples are presented in the appendix.
xvi All estimations will be carried out with the sample excluding the workers who participated in 2001 and 2002 to show these two years do not drive our main findings. See the section on robustness for more details.
xvii For instance, consider two MSAs, A and B, whose AJC receive an average of 100 workers. MSA A has 500,000
workers in the labor force and MSA B has 50,000. An additional 20 displaced workers will increase AJC workload by 20% in both places, and the staff at both A and B will face similar difficulties. However, these additional 20 displacement workers have different implications in terms of the unemployment rate.
xviii Multicollinearity between unemployment measures is minimal. The correlation of the change in the number of unemployed workers at participation and the unemployment rate at exit is only 0.0246. (The average participation duration for our MSA sample is 59.55 weeks. This is longer for trainees at 67 weeks.) The correlation between participation year and the exit year unemployment rates is 0.1674. The correlation between the number of unemployed workers and the change of this number over time is also only 0.0307. xix We also carried out the analysis of service delivery changes using a quadratic model that is similar to Equation (2). The results are qualitatively the same. The results of these estimations are provided in the appendix.
xx Some college includes people with an associate degree or those who entered a 4-year college but have not completed it.
xxi
The quarterly earnings are recorded for three quarters following the exit of the program. These earnings figures are simply total earnings during the calendar quarter. In the case of unemployment, it is reported as zero. In more problematic cases of partial employment or part-time employment, total earnings for the participant during the quarter are reported. Prior to participation, it is possible that the participant was already displaced and found a temporary position with lower pay between displacement and participation. In this case, the earnings reported do not represent the earnings at the job that was certified for TAA benefits; wage replacement calculated with these figures would be misleading. In order to reduce the measurement error caused by this, we take two steps. First, we drop any earnings figures below $2,000 or above $50,000. The $2,000 cutoff is roughly the quarterly earnings from full time employment at minimum wage of $5.15. (The federal minimum wage was $5.15 from September 1st 1997 to July 23, 2007; $5.85 from Jul 24, 2007 to Jul 23, 2008 $6.55 from Jul 24, 2008 to Jul 23, 2009 and $7.25 since Jul 24, 2009 to present. Our sample period including three quarters of observations before and after participation is from 1997Q2 to 2009Q1.) $50,000 is an arbitrary cut-off used to reduce errors caused by misreported figures. Most TAA eligible workers are low-skilled manufacturing workers. Annual earnings of $200,000 are not only unlikely, but also not of our interest since these cases are certainly outliers even if they are not misreported figures. Second, we use the maximum value of the (up to three) available and valid (between $2,000 and $50,000) quarterly earnings to capture the legitimate employment both prior to participation and after the exit. xxii We focus on the occupational skills training for two reasons. First, training is the most important benefit of the TAA program and approximately 90% of trainees choose occupational skills training. Second, occupational skills training show the most drastic change during the period of high unemployment growth.
xxiii Using the dummy specification on estimations for wage replacement shows bigger drops in wages with smaller increases of local unemployment. Wage replacement drops with increases in unemployment growth. Decreases in unemployment are mostly insignificant. These results are in the appendix.
xxiv Again, the dummy specification for these results is in the appendix.
xxv This positive impact of occupational skills training during the period of rising unemployment is not driven by the rise in the quality of trainees. Previous earnings, ethnicity, sex and education are virtually identical in the sample that receives training when local unemployment increases by 5% or more compared to the other trainees.
xxvi The negative sign could be the same selection issue as in the case of occupational skills training. Participants who are likely to have a harder time finding employment enroll in training and thus stay in the program for a longer period.
xxvii 10-15% and 15-25% increases in unemployment raises the occupational skills training enrollment by 28.8 and 38.5 percentage points, respectively. The main sample showed 15.5 and 15.6 percentage point increases in Table 5 . xxviii We lose a lot of significance because some counties are incredibly small. We reran these estimates with counties no smaller than our smallest MSA and the results are essentially the same as the main results from the MSA sample.
xxix Authors' calculation considering a dummy for unemployment increases beyond 5% interacted with obtaining occupational training in these cases.
xxx LAUS uses Henderson 13 filter for longitudinal smoothing.
